3 things I want to emphasize about the WHO's proposed IHR Amendments

Did the US provide the template?

Libby Klein’s Substack, which I urge you to take a look at, mentioned a few things that I had glossed over regarding the ‘zero draft’ of the International Health Regulations amendments, and I want to address them.

1. ‘Potential’ emergencies: the oxymoron only a lawyer could love

First, the language about a potential for a pandemic or public health emergency is extremely important. This may have derived from US bill language.

Between 2005 and 2015, the DHS or HHS Secretaries declared continuous anthrax emergencies. There were no human anthrax cases in the US during this ten year period. But there was an anthrax vaccine program in the military, with mandatory vaccines that were licensed but, like the COVID vaccines, had never met FDA testing standards.

The federal leadership wanted to protect itself from damages caused by these vaccines in military service-members, because the Secretary of the Army had indemnified the vaccine manufacturer in 1998 (Bioport, later renamed Emergent BioSolutions). If damages were ever granted, the Army was on the hook to pay them. So the administration geared up and issued emergency use authorizations for the vaccine, based on:

a) The claim that prevention against inhalation anthrax was an off-label use of the product, (because a labelled use would not be eligible for an EUA) and

b) That there was the potential for an anthrax emergency, which was allowed in the statute. Of course, there is always the potential for anything at all. This is the loophole through which anything goes.

https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2005/08/03/05-15233/authorization-of-emergency-use-of-anthrax-vaccine-adsorbed-for-prevention-of-inhalation-anthrax-by

I thought you might like to read the language right from the federal register:

On December 10, 2004, under section 564(b)(1)(B) of the act, the Deputy Secretary of Defense determined that there is a significant potential for a military emergency involving a heightened risk to U.S. military forces of attack with anthrax. On December 22, 2004, DoD requested an EUA for AVA for protection against inhalation anthrax. DoD asked for a 6-month authorization and indicated that, if necessary, it might ask for an extension of the duration of the EUA.

By converting a licensed product to an EUA, it became a “covered countermeasure” and everyone involved with it was shielded from being sued under the PREP Act.

The WHO does not have to use the term ‘potential’ just to save itself from lawsuits. It can be used for a broad range of directives, and they may be binding on all 194 member nations.

Now that you understand how this scam works, you can see how the WHO is using the same device, in its proposed Article 2 of the IHR amendments:

https://apps.who.int/gb/wgihr/pdf_files/wgihr1/WGIHR_Compilation-en.pdf
Article 2 Scope and purpose
The purpose and scope of these Regulations are to prevent, protect against, prepare, control and provide a public health response to the international spread of diseases including through health systems readiness and resilience in ways that are commensurate with and restricted to public health risk all risks with a potential to impact public health, and which avoid unnecessary interference with international traffic and trade, livelihoods, human rights, and equitable access to health products and health care technologies and know how.

See what they did? They got rid of the phrase “restricted to public health risks” and replaced it with “restricted to all risks with a potential to impact public health.”

This appears to include even risks that might improve public health, such as cleaning up pollution. Why did they omit “negatively” before “impact public health”?

Including the word ‘potential’ means virtually anything could be within the WHO’s purview. And that is the real point.

2. As in the US law discussed above, the WHO could impose its will before, during and after a potential emergency

If it has been determined in accordance with Article 12 that a public health emergency of international concern is occurring, or the event has a potential to become a PHEIC, the Director-General shall issue temporary recommendations in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 49. Such temporary recommendations may be modified or extended as appropriate, including after it has been determined that a public health emergency of international concern has ended…

Just like the USG did with its potential for an anthrax vaccine emergency, the declaration can go on virtually forever.

3. Binding recommendations: WHO’s second oxymoron

I was unable to find a definition of “recommendation” within the IHR amendments proposed. However, the document makes clear in numerous places that what WHO says, goes—as one chunk of the amendments requires nations to build infrastructure to guarantee that WHO recommendations are carried out at national and subnational levels, in a great deal of detail.

This all relates to the “zero draft” of the IHR amendments. This is not the final version, but it does give us a very good idea of the WHO-globalist wish list. It helps us know what we are fighting.