The Pandemic Treaty developers do not want to tell other negotiators how they actually envision it working

Instead they do an extraordinary waffle and put off the major decisions for future documents, and may be trying to head problems off by negotiating them instead in a biodiversity treaty

There is a very interesting article written by an NGO that has long followed and provided commentary on doings at the WHO, called the Third World Network. I have cited them before. It is a very detailed article so I am just pulling quotes and adding a few comments. The gist of the article is that the developing nations are refusing to explain how aspects of the pandemic treaty will be carried out: what are the specifics? Why won’t they say?

And in the next post, I speculate that maybe the developing nation negotiators are playing for time, because they are hoping that the contentious matters of pathogen access and benefit sharing (PABS) will be resolved at a UN meeting on biological diversity that starts in 2 weeks.

https://twn.my/title2/health.info/2024/hi241002.htm

During the 11th INB meeting in September, a group of countries, primarily consisting of developed countries, led by the United Kingdom prepared this document titled “A non-paper on a further instrument on pandemic prevention and surveillance, taking into account a One Health approach to pandemic PPR and the amended IHR (2005)”.

The non-paper provides justifications for a proposed additional pandemic prevention instrument distinct from the WHO pandemic instrument to comprehensively deal with prevention, preparedness and response.

The document contains four sections: (1) background, (2) purpose and justification, (3) indicative scope, (4) nature of the instrument and the process to agree on an instrument.

the section on the scope identifies broadly three areas of interest, measures at the human-animal-environment interface, person-to-person transmission and a coordinated multi-sectoral surveillance.

Finally, the nature of the instrument has been explained as containing both legally binding and non-binding elements, essentially meaning the new instrument would be in the nature of international treaty.

The non-paper was produced in response to developing country delegations who asked the proponents of One Health Approach to Pandemic Prevention to explain practical measures that Member States would like to propose for pandemic prevention, under the WHO pandemic instrument. According to sources, the United Kingdom volunteered to prepare this document in response to the demand from these delegations and requested other delegations to support them in the preparation of the document.

Finally, nations want to know what the Pandemic Treaty is really all about. How are you proposing to prevent pandemics, guys? What will nations be asked or required to do? Where is the evidence showing that these meaures prevent pandemics?—Nass

The document, to the contrary, takes the need for further instrument as a given, and then seeks to justify why a new instrument is the way to go forward, rather than explaining what practical measures the new instrument would entail.

“Possible practical measures and safeguards are not visible in the non-paper,” one of them observed.

The section on indicative scope gives a bulleted list of nine paragraphs about what the new instrument would include. In summary it is claimed that the new instrument would:

1.      Enhance and sustain global and national political commitment and multisectoral coordination;

2.      Enhance global capacity in the areas of prevention, public health surveillance, and coordinated, multisectoral surveillance as well as the national capacities;

3.      Articulate further capacity building and implementation actions and support to enable Parties, and particularly, developing country Parties, to effectively implement the provisions of the instrument;

4.      Include details that would set out what countries need to do for the implementation of Article 4, including through a One Health approach to pandemic PPR (prevention, preparedness and response) (i.e. more detail/specific actions than outlined in the Pandemic Agreement);

5.      Elaborate the relationship/potential for synergies with other international instruments and standards, in particular the amended IHR (2005), including those that address the drivers of emergence, with the aim of enhancing pandemic prevention;

6.      Elaborate actions to support multi-sectoral coordination at the community, national, regional, and global levels;

7.      Further clarify factors that could contribute to the emergence or spread of PHEICs with pandemic potential, pandemic emergencies, and those originating from zoonotic spillover/spillback, depending on national contexts;

8.      Advance understanding of drivers of zoonotic pathogen spillover/spillback at the human-animal-environment interface and promote primary prevention efforts intended to reduce emergence for high-risk areas;

9.      Elaborate priority evidence and risk-based actions that require a One Health approach to pandemic PPR.

Almost all the above claims are articulated superficially and are nothing different from what can be already understood from the text of Articles 4 and 5 of the WHO pandemic instrument.

The whole point of calling for this exercise on a non-paper was to make the developed country proponents explain clearly certain practical measures that they are envisaging to be part of Articles 4 and 5 and their implementation. This purpose is not served by the nine bulleted paragraphs as contained in the non-paper. 

the negotiator also expressed concern that “the WHO Director-General, the Secretariat and a handful of Member States want to conclude the INB’s work by December 2024, and thus the INB Bureau and few other Member States are ruling out these other options, such as addressing pragmatic and equitable pandemic prevention measures under the WHO pandemic instrument.” [Why the need for speed when there is no clarity on the major contentious issues? In order to conclude an agreement while the Biden administration remains in place?—Nass]

According to another developing country negotiator, certain developed countries are trying to avoid experienced and skilful negotiators from developing countries who are currently participating in INB. “They are planning to delay negotiations on substantive elements such as pandemic prevention, and pathogen access and benefit sharing, waiting for a change in the composition of delegations in the developing countries. Currently we have largely the team which successfully completed the negotiations on IHR 2005 amendments and now we have the experience in negotiating legally binding health instruments. Certain developed countries are aware of the fact that with our current team they have to yield more,” said the negotiator. [An old strategy—Nass]

A new negotiating body and a preparatory committee of experts

The non-paper regarding the nature of the new instrument and the process to develop it does not prescribe a precise form of the new instrument. Instead, it nudges the INB Member States to undertake a discussion on “work to be undertaken following the adoption of the Pandemic Agreement and of its broader legal architecture”, along the lines of a Bureau’s proposal that raised so many concerns in April and May 2024, in particular during the 77th World Health Assembly (WHA) and the INB negotiations immediately preceding the same.

According to a diplomatic source, it is quite strange the proponents believe there needs to be further consultations with experts and stakeholders in constructing further legal obligations on pandemic prevention, after almost around 3 years of negotiations in the WHO. The proponents also think this as a justification for the new process – as if this is not something which the INB is already doing currently.

“Firstly, we had the Working Group on Strengthening WHO Preparedness and Response to Health Emergencies (WGPR). It negotiated for around one year. Secondly the WGPR gave rise to two other negotiating bodies, the INB and the Working Group on Amendments to IHR 2005.  All of these bodies met several times formally and informally, over the last 3 years, open to stakeholders and members of the quadripartite. Now, proponents want to continue negotiation for another 1 to 2 years through an additional process. Yet they fail to provide us with an indicative list of measures they want to apply in pandemic prevention and why it should be negotiated in a new process under a new negotiating group,” said the source. [We know why—it is the equivalent of doctor-shopping until you get the prescription you sought all along.—Nass]

Another negotiator said, “Basically they (developed countries) are not prepared, and they want time to prepare. That is understandable, but why should we commit to a new instrument before they explain what it is all about…”

“The impact of having an additional instrument on health emergency prevention, preparedness and response is itself concerning, and now we are talking about three additional instruments instead of one. The concerns on fragmentation are real and true, personally I am aware of them. But we don’t want to go against our traditional allies, we would like to give them a chance to justify themselves on the need for multiple instruments. We hope in the end common sense prevails,” a developed country negotiator told TWN on condition of anonymity.

[The WHO pandemic instrument currently under negotiation proposes a PABS instrument. It also proposes a pandemic prevention and surveillance instrument. Both are in addition to the existing International Health Regulations 2005, which deals with health emergency prevention, preparedness, and response, including pandemic emergencies.]